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Background: Waiting time to receive medical care is a disturbing phenomenon in many healthcare systems.
Furthermore, waiting times are usually distributed in the population in an inequitable way.
Objectives: In this paper we focus on one aspect of the possible inequities associated with waiting times for MRIs
and elective surgeries – different waiting times by income level.
Methods: We used the CBS’s 2009-2010 linked health-income data, which included 7,175 households (24,595 individuals).
Actual waiting time for MRI and expected waiting time for surgeries were measured on a 4-categories ordinal scale. Both
ordered probit and sample selection ordered probit – to account for possible correlation between the need for these
services and the waiting time for them – were used to estimate the income effect on waiting time, controlling for a
vast set of personal characteristics.
Results: Rich Israelis are more likely than poor ones to be, controlling for health state, on the waiting list for MRI, but not
for surgeries. Income has no effect on the actual waiting time for MRI. Income has no effect on the expected waiting
time for surgeries in the probit model, but has a significant negative effect in the sample selection model. Ownership of
voluntary insurance increases the probability to be on the waiting list for both MRI and surgeries, but has no effect – as
does having public finance only of the care – on waiting time. The results also show that sicker persons and those
residing in the periphery wait longer for surgery.
Conclusions: We found some evidence that rich persons expect a shorter wait for surgeries, which is not explained by
voluntary insurance ownership or by using private finance. We found solid evidence that the expected waiting time for
surgeries is longer for sicker persons and those in the periphery. Further research with a larger sample based on actual
waiting times might shed more light on the issue of waiting time for medical care and its distribution in Israel.Background
Waiting time to receive medical care is a disturbing
phenomenon in many healthcare systems. As with
the issue of consumer-cost sharing, policy makers are
deliberating between viewing waiting time as a tool
to reduce consumers’ moral hazard and to increase
efficiency, viewing waiting times as an indication of
possible inefficiency in delivering care, and acknowledging
the fact that waiting times are usually distributed in the
population in an inequitable way. Furthermore, the issue
of waiting times is generally related to the issue of
private voluntary insurance ownership which by itself
is a controversial policy issue.
In many OECD countries, long waiting times for
health care services is an important health policy issue. A
recent OECD survey [1] revealed problems with waitingCorrespondence: amirsh@ekmd.huji.ac.il
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unless otherwise stated.times in almost all OECD countries including primary
care, out-patient specialist care, emergency care, cancer
care and elective (non-emergency) care. More than half of
OECD countries have long waiting times for elective
treatments, and these waiting times are often a contentious
political issue.
In this paper we focus on one aspect of the possible
inequities associated with waiting times for medical
care – different waiting times by income level. National
health insurance systems, such as in Israel, adopted the
principles of equality and fairness. In order to enable the
achievement of these principles, the delivery of care is
totally separated from the income of the insured. Evidence
on inequality in waiting times in general and according to
income, in particular, raises a “red flag” in the society.
Relating (reliable) income data to waiting times on an
Israeli national level was made possible by the linkage,
performed by the Central Bureau of Statistics, of the
2009 Health survey with the 2010 Income survey. DueThis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
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and to elective surgeries performed in hospitals. While
MRIs and surgeries are associated with a major burden
of illness, the yearly number of patients needing them is
small (1-2%). Consequently, a major limitation of the
database is the small number of cases.
Methods
Data
The data we used was taken from a Central Bureau of
Statistics file which linked information on households
from two surveys. The first survey, which was conducted in
2009, gathered socio-demographic and health information.
The second survey, carried out in 2010, gathered both indi-
vidual and household information regarding incomes. Of
the 8,713 households (28,968 individuals) who responded
to the health survey, 7,175 (24,595) – aver 80% - were
matched with information from the income survey.
The main reason for non-match was the dynamics of
households’ formation: individuals change households and
the match has no comparative meaning. Naturally,
the rate of non-match is higher in the 20-40 age
group. The linked data constitute a unique source of
information, including health, use of health services
as well as income data.
We were interested in evaluating how different vari-
ables – and in particular income - impact the length
of time Israelis need to wait for medical care. We
focus, restricted by the way the questions were asked,
on scheduled (at the time of the interview) surgeries
and on MRIs which were taken during the year prior
to the interview.
MRI
Out of 28,968 individuals in the health survey, 559 (2%)
underwent a MRI in the previous year. 82 of the 559
were conducted during hospitalization. We focused on
the remaining 477 individuals whose MRI was not c while
being hospitalized. For 460 individuals data on waiting
times and incomes were available. They include publicly
and privately financed MRIs.
The actual length of the wait for the MRI was divided
(in the interview) into four ordered categories: less
than one month, one to three months, three to six
months and six to twelve (the maximal wait was less
than 1 year).
Surgeries
Out of 28,968 individuals in the health survey, 295 (1%)
had a scheduled surgery at the time of the interview.
Because only 18 of the 295 surgeries were to be carried
out outside of a hospital, we focused on the remaining
278 individuals whose surgeries - publicly or privately
financed - were to be carried out in a hospital.Because the surgeries that the survey referred to were
surgeries scheduled in the future (as opposed to MRIs
that were already carried out in the past year), the survey
broke the wait into two periods: from the time the
individual was registered to the surgery until the date
of the survey and from the date of the survey until
the scheduled date of the surgery. Of the 278 cases
where the individual was waiting for a surgery in a
hospital, in 91 cases a specific date for the surgery was not
reported. The answer reported was “as recommended by
the doctor”. After excluding these cases and an additional
five cases in which the individual did not know the length
of the wait, we remained with 182 surgeries scheduled to
be done in a hospital whose length of wait and income
were known.
Both periods had the same four options as in MRIs
(up to a month, 1-3 months, 3-6 months and 6-12
months). Expected waiting time for surgery was defined
of the sum of two waiting periods. Because there were
relatively few inpatients and nine separate (but sometimes
overlapping) waiting categories, we combined categories
and were left with four ordered categories; (1) expected
wait is less than 2 months, (2) 2-3 months, (3) expected
wait is 4-5 months, and (4) 6-12 months.
We also had information regarding the type of surgery
to be conducted (8 categories: eye, e.n.t., heart, stomach or
digestive system, gynecology or urinary tract, orthopedic,
blood vessels and other). Because of the small numbers
of surgical patients, we chose to use the pooled data,
disregarding the type of surgery.
Independent variables
The focal variable income was indicated by the household’s
monthly net income per standardized adult (in thousands
IS). Health was measured by the number of chronic
sicknesses (out of ten: high blood pressure, heart attack,
other heart diseases, stroke, diabetes, asthma, chronic lung
disease, chronic disease in the digestive system, cancerous
disease and depression or anxieties) reported by the
individual.
The additional covariates were: place of MRI (hospital
or community), age (in 20 age groups, from 0 to 85+),
sex, ownership of voluntary health insurance (yes vs. no),
public finance only of the MRI / the surgery (yes, possibly
with some copayment vs. any private finance), peripheral
status (peripheral vs. intermediate or center), origin (Israel
and former USSR vs. all other, including Arabs) and level
of education (12+ vs. up to 12 years of schooling).
Statistical strategy
MRIs
In order to evaluate the income’s and other variables’
effects on the length of the wait for an MRI we ran
an Ordered Probit regression with the length of wait
Table 1 Variables means




Waiting time (months)* 1.588
(median = 0.5)
0.088 1.414 1.762
MRI in hospital 0.714 0.024 0.667 0.761
Female 0.556 0.026 0.505 0.608
Age 12.278 0.214 11.858 12.698
Income per standardized adult
(in thousands IS)
4.917 0.165 4.593 5.241
Voluntary insurance ownership 0.873 0.018 0.838 0.907
Public finance only 0.823 0.015 0.793 0.852
Number of chronic illnesses 1.079 0.076 0.930 1.228
Peripheral location 0.128 0.017 0.094 0.162
Israel or former USSR origin 0.571 0.026 0.520 0.622
Education 12+ years 0.488 0.003 0.481 0.494









Female 0.445 0.042 0.363 0.527
Age 11.999 0.436 11.137 12.860
Income per standardized adult
(in thousands IS)
3.996 0.222 3.556 4.435
Voluntary insurance ownership 0.814 0.035 0.746 0.882
Public finance only 0.694 0.010 0.676 0.712
Number of chronic illnesses 1.005 0.106 0.795 1.215
Peripheral location 0.231 0.035 0.162 0.301
Israel or former USSR origin 0.475 0.042 0.392 0.559
Education 12+ years 0.488 0.003 0.482 0.495
*Calculated based on the categories’ mid-points.
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and income and all the variables mentioned above as
explanatory variables. An indicator whether the MRI
was taken in an outpatient clinic or in the community was
introduced as well.
Surgeries
We ran an Ordered Probit regression on the expected
4-level waiting time variable for surgeries using the
same set of explanatory variables as we did with MRIs
excluding place of MRI.
Accounting for the selectivity of MRI/surgeries users
The above analysis is conditional on having been registered
for a MRI or surgery. The effects of the independent
variables on waiting time might be biased since the
need for a MRI or surgery is not random and may be
correlated with these independent variables. In the
second part of the analysis we used the Heckman Selection
Model to account for such correlation. The Heckman
model specifies a 2 equation model: first, a Probit model
for the probability of needing a MRI or surgery, and the
second equation specifies the waiting time (Ordered
Probit). The first equation applies to the entire sample and
the second – to the selected sample of those needing a
surgery, but the (non-zero) correlation between the two
equations is accounted for. For MRI, the identifying
variable was voluntary insurance ownership. Voluntary
insurance ownership affects the use of services, but once
using public finance only - or having made any private
finance - of the procedure is held constant, it does not
expect to exercise an effect on waiting time. For surgeries,
education served as the identifying variable. The effect of
education on the use of services is well known. Its effect
on expected waiting time, controlling for income, is
assumed to be small, since while higher education is
correlated with better navigation of the medical bureau-
cracy, this applies more (at least in Israel) to the stage of
getting a referral for the procedure.
The model was estimated using maximum likelihood.
In all runs, since the coefficients of the Ordered Probit
models have no clear meaning, we present the marginal
effects of the independent variables on the probabilities
to belong to the specific waiting time categories. The
Additional file 1 presents the cut points and their 95%
CIs. These cut points divide the normal distribution into




Table 1 panel A presents the description of the population
which underwent a MRI in the year prior to the interview.
The mean waiting time (computed based on the categories’midpoints) was 1.6 months (median = 0.5 months). 56%
of the treated persons were women, mean age was 12
(of 20 age groups), namely, 45-49, and income per
standardized adult was 4,917 IS. The mean number of
chronic conditions was 1.1. 13% of the treated population
resided in a peripheral location, and 57% were of Israeli
born or former USSR origin. 49% had more than 12 years
of schooling.
87% owned voluntary private insurance, and the share
of MRI users whose MRI was completely financed publicly
was 82%. These two variables are significantly related
(p = 0.004). While all those who did not own voluntary
insurance had their MRI financed completely publicly,
21% of those who owned voluntary insurance had public
finance only of their MRI. Among those who had
public finance only, 3% owned voluntary insurance.
Both voluntary insurance ownership and having a
public finance only are significantly related to income
(positively at p = 0 and negatively p = 0.06 respectively).
After some experimentation with the estimation of the
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lic finance only in the waiting time equation and voluntary
insurance ownership in the use of MRI equation.
Table 2 panel A describes the distribution of waiting
time for MRI. 59% of the MRIs were performed after less
than a month waiting. Another 31% were performed
after waiting for 1-3 months. In 10% of the cases, waiting
time was longer than 3 months. The distribution is
quite similar between MRI in the community and in
an outpatient clinic.
Table 3 indicates that waiting time for MRI is not related
to any of the individual characteristics, including income.
Waiting for an outpatient clinic MRI is longer than the
wait for MRI performed in a community clinic. Similarly,
the sample selection model (Table 4 panel A) shows
no significant determinants of waiting time for MRI
(the Additional file 1 shows further that in fact all cut
points are not significantly different from zero and the
model does not correspond to the data) .
From Table 4 panel B it is clear that advanced age and
worse health are positively related to the likelihood of
having a MRI. Controlling for age and the number of
chronic sicknesses, income has a significant positive
effect and so does ownership of voluntary insurance.
In other words, while rich persons are more likely to
undergo a MRI, controlling for age and sickness, their
waiting time is similar to that of poor persons.
Surgeries
We first tried to see whether having a missing value on
the expected waiting time due to “the date of the surgery
was determined by the recommendation of the doctor”
is random. It turned out that this group includes moreTable 2 The distribution of waiting time for MRI and for
surgeries (%)
A. Actual waiting time for
MRI in months




Up to 1 59 59 60
1-3 31 31 32
3-6 7 6 8
6-12 3 4 -
Total 100 100 100
n 460 331 129






Up to 1 31 32 20
2-3 23 23 26
4-5 23 24 25
6-12 23 21 29
Total 100 100 100
n 182 35 44women than in the valid sample (66% vs. 44%); has a
lower mean income (IS3,316 vs. IS 3,996); is sicker
(1.5 chronic conditions on average vs. 1) and is less
educated (78% with less than 12 years of schooling vs.
64% in the valid sample). Consequently, the working
sample is somewhat medically and socio-economically
stronger than the population waiting for surgeries.
Table 1 panel B presents the variables’ means among
persons who are on the waiting list for an inpatient
surgery. The mean expected waiting time is 3.5 months
(median = 2.5 months). 44% of the population were women,
mean age was 12 (of 20 age groups), namely, 45-49, and
mean income per standardized adult was IS3,996. The
mean number of chronic conditions was one. 23% of the
population resided in a peripheral location, and 48% were
of Israeli born or former USSR origin. 48% had more than
12 years of schooling.
81% owned voluntary private insurance, and the share
whose surgery is to be financed from public money only
was 69%, less than the 82% found among users of
MRI. Among those who owned voluntary insurance,
36% had any private finance in their future surgery.
The corresponding rate among MRI users was 21%.
Furthermore, among those who had no voluntary insurance,
15% had some out of pocket finance of their prospective
surgery. Among those who had any private finance of their
surgery, 90% owned voluntary insurance. Rich persons are
more likely to own voluntary insurance (p = 0) and to make
any private finance (p = 0.005). As with waiting for MRI,
after some experimentation with the estimation of the
models, we decided to include the variable indicating public
finance only in the waiting time equation and voluntary
insurance ownership in the being on the waiting list for
surgery equation.
Table 2 panel B shows that 31% have an expected waiting
time of less than a month. The remaining 69% are
distributed uniformly across the waiting time categories of
2-3, 4-5 and 6+. Waiting time for orthopedic surgeries –
the biggest single type of surgery – is somewhat longer,
while that for eye surgeries – the second biggest type – is
distributed in a similar way to its distribution among all
persons on waiting lists for surgeries.
Table 5 shows, first, that income has no significant
effect on none of the probabilities of the waiting time
categories. Two characteristics do exercise significant
effects: number of chronic conditions and peripheral
location. Sicker persons or those residing in the periphery
wait longer than healthy persons or persons waiting for a
surgery in the center.
In the sample selection model of expected waiting for
surgery (Table 6 panel A), the income effect is significant:
rich Israelis are likely to wait shorter times than otherwise
similar poor persons. As was found in the ordered probit
model, sicker and persons waiting in the periphery are
Table 3 Ordered Probit marginal effects (M.E.) on the probability to belong to the various waiting time categories for MRI
Up to 1 month 2-3 months 4-5 months 6-12 months
M.E. z M.E. z M.E. z M.E. z
Hospital (vs. in the community) -0.124 -2.35 0.067 2.33 0.036 2.31 0.022 1.98
Female (vs. male) 0.081 1.74 -0.044 -1.72 -0.023 -1.68 -0.014 -1.6
Age 0.001 0.19 -0.001 -0.19 0.000 -0.19 0.000 -0.19
Income per standardized adult (in thousands IS) 0.014 1.29 -0.007 -1.29 -0.004 -1.25 -0.002 -1.23
Public finance only 0.092 1.59 -0.049 -1.58 -0.026 -1.53 -0.016 -1.51
Number of chronic illnesses 0.005 0.28 -0.003 -0.28 -0.001 -0.28 -0.001 -0.28
Peripheral location -0.067 -0.97 0.036 0.97 0.019 0.94 0.012 0.97
Israel or former USSR origin 0.078 1.49 -0.042 -1.48 -0.022 -1.44 -0.014 -1.43
Pseudo R squared =0.02
Bold = significantly different from zero at p = 0.05.
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to wait less than men as well. We note that planning
“public finance only” toward the surgery has no effect
on the expected waiting time in both models. This effect
remains zero even when income is excluded from the
equations.
Table 6 panel B presents the marginal effects of the
personal characteristics on the probability to have a
surgery scheduled. While income has no effect, all the
other covariates exercise significant marginal effects:
women are more likely to be on the waiting list for a
surgery than men; older persons – than young ones;
those with voluntary health insurance - than thoseTable 4 Sample Selection marginal effects (M.E.) on the proba
for MRI
A. Waiting time equation (Ordered Probit) Up to 1 mo
M.E.
Hospital (vs. in the community) -0.054
Female (vs. male) 0.041
Age 0.005
Income per standardized adult (in thousands IS) 0.006
Public finance only 0.056
Number of chronic illnesses 0.018
Peripheral location -0.029
Israel or former USSR origin 0.034
B. On the waiting list for MRI equation (binary probit)
Female (vs. male) 0.061
Age 0.040
Income per standardized adult (in thousands IS) 0.013
Voluntary insurance ownership 0.275
Number of chronic illnesses 0.172
Peripheral location 0.001
Education higher than 12 years -0.011
Bold = significantly different from zero at p = 0.05.without; sick persons – than healthy persons; in the
periphery – than in the center; and persons with
higher education – less than persons with lower education.
Discussion
The findings indicate that 60% of those who had a
MRI waited less than a month. This rate is somewhat
lower than the rate found in a later population survey
(Brammli-Greenberg et al. [2]) of 77%. While the likelihood
of having an MRI is affected by the age, health status,
income and voluntary insurance ownership, actual waiting
time to MRI is not related to any of the personal charac-
teristics, and in particular, income does not have any effectbility to belong to the various waiting time categories
nth 2-3 months 4-5 months 6-12 months
z M.E. z M.E. z M.E. z
-0.35 -0.049 -1.14 0.003 0.02 0.100 1.98
0.38 0.038 0.88 -0.002 -0.02 -0.077 -1.33
0.80 0.004 0.37 0.000 -0.02 -0.008 -0.45
0.39 0.005 0.78 -0.001 -0.02 -0.001 -1.11
0.63 -0.044 -0.73 -0.009 -0.41 -0.003 -0.36
1.00 0.017 0.36 -0.001 -0.02 -0.034 -0.44
-0.33 -0.026 -0.77 0.001 0.02 0.054 0.92








Table 5 Ordered Probit marginal effects (M.E.) on the probability to belong to the various waiting time categories for
surgeries
Up to 1 month 2-3 months 4-5 months 6+ months
M.E. z M.E. z M.E. z M.E. z
Female (vs. male) 0.085 1.37 0.013 1.19 -0.022 -1.28 -0.076 -1.37
Age 0.012 1.59 0.002 1.56 -0.003 -1.49 -0.011 -1.63
Income per standardized adult (in thousands IS) 0.016 1.58 0.002 1.24 -0.004 -1.61 -0.014 -1.51
Public finance only -0.013 -0.21 -0.002 -0.21 0.003 0.21 0.012 0.21
Number of chronic illnesses -0.061 -2.04 -0.009 -1.71 0.016 1.87 0.054 2.06
Peripheral location -0.217 -3.13 -0.032 -2.16 0.056 2.55 0.193 3.17
Israel or former USSR origin 0.064 1.04 0.010 0.97 -0.017 -1.03 -0.057 -1.04
Pseudo R squared =0.0635
Bold = significantly different from zero at p = 0.05.
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Brammli-Greenberg et al. [2] report similar findings.
46% report an expected waiting time for elective
surgeries greater than 4 months. Siciliani et al. [1] report
that actual waiting time for elective surgeries in 2010 in
OECD countries were much lower: 18% had waiting more
than 4 months in Australia, 21% in the UK and in
Norway, 22% in Sweden and 25% in Canada. Some of
the gap might be related to the difference between
actual and expected waiting times. Another source of
bias might be the omission of about a (relatively
sicker and poorer) third of our cases where waiting
time was missing (the date “was determined by theTable 6 Sample selection marginal effects (M.E.) on the proba
for surgeries
A. Waiting time equation(ordered probit) Up to 1
M.E.
Female (vs. male) 0.006
Age 0.000
Income per standardized adult (in thousands IS) 0.019
Public finance only -0.001
Number of chronic illnesses -0.005
Peripheral location -0.013
Israel or former USSR origin 0.003
B. On the waiting list for surgeries equation(binary probit)
M.E.
Female (vs. male) -0.126
Age 0.036
Income per standardized adult (in thousands IS) -0.014
Voluntary insurance ownership 0.200
Number of chronic illnesses 0.130
Peripheral location 0.240
Education higher than 12 years -0.114
Bold = significantly different from zero at p = 0.05.recommendation of the doctor”), and in fact could be
lower than 4 months.
The above OECD report compares the two types of
waiting time measures: actual and expected. Actual
waiting time naturally reflects reality. However, those
who actually used the service do not form a random
sample of those who scheduled the procedure. Some
patients on the waiting list might give up the procedure,
might be declined later by the treating doctors or might
die. Expected waiting time might not be materialized
in reality, but reflects the expectation – including past
waiting – of all the patients on the waiting list at the time
of the survey.bility to belong to the various waiting time categories
month 2-3 months 4-5 months 6+ months
z M.E. z M.E. z M.E. z
2.06 -0.003 -2.02 -0.002 -1.99 -0.001 -2.02
-0.91 0.000 0.92 0.000 0.88 0.000 0.88
2.37 -0.001 -1.99 -0.001 -1.98 -0.001 -1.98
-0.1 0.001 0.1 0.000 0.1 0.000 0.11
-3.30 0.003 2.94 0.001 3.07 0.001 3.03
-3.50 0.007 3.19 0.004 3.15 0.003 3.04
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ing time for MRI, depends on several personal characteris-
tics. In particular, when the unobserved correlation
between waiting for a surgery and the length of the wait-
ing is accounted for in a sample selection model, expected
waiting time decreases with increasing income.
Also, it is longer for sicker persons and for residents of
the periphery. The former finding might indicate the
existence of implicit risk selection or cream skimming –
by facing long waiting time, sicker unprofitable individuals
might be induced to exit the queue or even to switch
sickness funds. The longer wait in the periphery than in
the center is probably a reflection of a generally lower
supply of inpatient care in general (2.5 general beds per
1,000 residents in the center vs. 1.5 in the periphery. The
Knesset, The Center for Research and Information [3],
and in specific types of surgery waited for in particular:
residents of the periphery are over represented among
those waiting for ENT and blood vessels surgeries – both
have higher than average (national) waiting time, and are
underrepresented in eyes, digestion, and other surgeries,
where mean wait is lower than average.
As was mentioned above, our working sample is some-
what healthier and richer than the population on the
waiting list because of missing values on waiting time. The
sign of the bias resulted depends on the actual waiting
time of those with missing values on expected waiting
time. If it is relatively long – as implied by our findings
about the effect of health and income – than the true
income effect is even larger. If the actual waiting time is
relatively short, the true income effect is smaller.
Because the small number of cases, we could not account
for heterogeneity originated from types of surgery. Some of
the effects on waiting time might reflect differences in
mean waiting time between the types of surgery. For
example, women tend to have a surgery less than men, and
they have shorter waiting times (Table 6 panel A). The
mean wait for gynecological surgeries is 2.6 months, shorter
than the overall mean wait (3.5 months), and this is
probably the explanation for the gender-effect on
waiting time. Advanced age and more reported chronic
conditions are associated with a greater tendency to be on
the waiting list for a surgery, and sicker persons wait for
longer periods of time. The highest mean number of
chronic conditions (1.7) is found among those waiting for
eye surgeries, where mean waiting time is 3 months, lower
than the overall average. However, the second highest
mean number of chronic conditions (1.1) is found among
those waiting for orthopedic surgeries, where mean wait is
4 months, above the overall mean.
Finally, what are the factors which might explain the
result that rich persons wait less than poor persons?
Again, one such channel is the assignment of persons to
types of surgery, namely, that rich persons are waiting forshorter-waiting-time surgeries. The highest mean income
(IS 5,142) is found among ENT surgeries, where mean
waiting time is 3.6, quite close to the overall mean. The
lowest mean income (IS 2,611) is found among surgeries
performed on the blood vessels, where mean wait is the
highest, 5 months (but the number of persons waiting for
these surgeries is 6 only). Consequently, the correlation
between income and type of surgery cannot account for
the negative income effect on waiting time.
Private care is often used to shorten waiting times for
surgery. In Israel, such use is financed by voluntary health
insurance or out of pocket. Ownership of voluntary health
insurance has a positive significant effect on the likelihood
of having a MRI or a surgery, controlling for income and
health, but it does not have any effect on waiting times.
Having used public finance only toward the MRI or the
surgery, controlling for income, does not have any effect
on waiting times either.
Conclusions
We do not find evidence indicating that, controlling for in-
come and health, private finance shortens waiting times.
We do find, subject to the limitations of the study men-
tioned above, that controlling for private finance and
health, rich Israelis wait less. We found solid evidence that
the expected waiting time for surgeries is longer for sicker
persons and those in the periphery. Further research, based
on actual waiting times and much bigger sample, might
shed more light on this disturbing finding.
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